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Abstract: This study aims to determine and analyze the effect of audit tenure, audit 
rotation, firm size and audit committee on audit quality with specialist auditors as 
moderating real estate & property companies listed on the Indonesia Stock 
Exchange. The results of this study prove that audit tenure has a negative and not 
significant effect on audit quality, while audit rotation has a negative and significant 
effect on audit quality, firm size has a positive and not significant effect on audit 
quality and audit committee has a positive and significant effect on audit quality. 
Specialist Auditors are not significant in moderating the effect of audit tenure, audit 
rotation, firm size and audit committee on audit quality. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Auditors are required to use their competence and independence to the 
maximum extent possible in conducting the audit process in order to produce an 
appropriate audit report because the auditor’s reputation is also at stake when the 
opinion turns out to be not in accordance with the actual condition of the company. 
The effort to improve audit quality is carried out by requiring minimum education 
per year, limiting tenure of the auditor with his client, as well as forming an audit 
committee that oversees internal auditors. The collapse of large companies such as 
Enron in the United States in 2001 was linked to a lack of independence from 
auditors. The incident at Enron's company involved Arthur Andersen's Public 
Accounting Firm, thereby increasing the importance of auditor independence in a 
Public Accounting Firm. In Indonesia, many companies and banks during the 1997-
1998 Asian crisis also raised concerns about poor audit quality related to the lack 
of auditor independence. Therefore, a new policy was issued concerning auditing 
regulations in Indonesia, namely Regulation of the Minister of Finance of the 
Republic of Indonesia Number 17 / PMK.01 / 2008 concerning “Public Accountant 
Services” article 3 which is an improvement on the Decree of the Minister of 
Finance No. 423 / KMK.06 / 2002 and No. 359 / KMK.06 / 2003. This regulation 
requires auditor partner rotation every 3 years and Public Accounting Firm 
switching every 6 years. This regulation is intended to minimize the occurrence of 
financial scandals involving auditors. Two members of the world’s largest public 
accounting firm Big Four, KPMG and PwC, were fined millions of pounds in fines 
for failing their audit. Of course this news adds concern to the auditor profession. 
KPMG is fined more than US $ 6.2 million or GBP4.8 million by the Securities and 
Exchanges Commission (SEC) because of its audit failure (auditing failure) of the 
energy company Miller Energy Resources which has increased the carrying value 
of its assets significantly by 100 times its real value is in the 2011 financial 
statements. KPMG has also issued an unqualified opinion on the financial 
statements. PwC was fined GBP5.1 million and was condemned by the Financial 
Reporting Council in the UK after PwC admitted wrongly in its audit of the Tenon 
Group RSM in fiscal year 2011. Observer of open company financial statements 
even made a report that the Public Accountant Office of KPMG, Deloitte, and Grant 
Thornton had conduct audits under quality. The fines imposed on public accounting 
firms have little effect on preventing public accounting firms from falling out of 
audit standards. Both the public accounting firm and the company that issued the 
fraudulent financial statements agreed to pay the fine without denying the findings 
of the financial authority. In addition, like the imposition of other sanctions, 
partners of public accounting firms are suspended or banned from providing audit 
services for two years. Failure of audits of financial statements by public accounting 
firms is generally caused by public accountants and their auditing team not 
implementing the audit standards as expected. Objectivity, professional accuracy, 
tiered supervision, risk analysis may not take place, resulting in audit failure. The 
end of an audit failure is the destruction of credibility and trust in the public 
accounting firm, the public accountant concerned, and the audit profession in 
general. The above event happened to an independent auditor whose position is 
external to the organization. 
 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Compliance comes from the word obedience which, according to the 
Indonesian Dictionary, obedience means liking according to orders, obeying orders 
or rules and being disciplined. Compliance means being obedient, submissive, 
compliant with regulations. Compliance theory is closely related to audit rotation 
of and audit tenure, according by definition compliance theory is obedient or 
submissive to regulations and it is in accordance with the variables in this study, so 
according to researchers compliance theory is considered a suitable theory to 
support research. 
 
2.1 Agency Theory 
Agency Theory is an implementation in modern organizations. Agency 
Theory emphasizes the importance of company owners (shareholders) handing over 
the management of the company to professionals who are called agents who 
understand more in conducting their daily business. Agency Theory states the need 
for independent auditor services can explained on the basis of agency theory, 
namely the relationship between the owner (principal) and management (agent). 
Therefore, in accordance with the understanding of agency theory above, the 
variables in this research have a relationship with the theory and the theory is very 
supportive of the variables this study, namely the audit committee and audit quality. 
 
 
 
2.2 Audit Quality 
De Angelo (1981) defines audit quality as a possibility that auditors will 
detect and report material misstatement. The dependent variable in this study is 
audit quality. Audit quality variables are measured using dummy variables, which 
are given a value of 1 if the company receives a going concern opinion. Meanwhile, 
if the client company does not accept going concern opinion, a value of 0 is given. 
 
2.3 Audit Tenure 
Audit tenure is the length of the cooperative relationship that exists between 
the auditor and client. Tenure audits are measured by dummy variables. Worth 1 if 
the company is audited by the same public accounting firm for <3 years, and 0 if 
the company is audited by the same public accounting firm for> 3 years. 
 
2.4 Audit rotation 
Audit rotation in this study is measured by seeing whether or not the 
auditees make changes to the Public Accountant during the period observed. Audit 
rotation is measured using a dummy variable, which is given code 1 if it changes 
the Public Accountant during the observed period, and is given code 0 if it does not 
change the Public Accountant during the observed period. 
 
2.5 Firm Size 
Fernando et.al (2010) states that large companies have a better internal 
control system compared to small companies. For small companies, if the financial 
statements are free from material misstatement, then it can give report users 
confidence and can increase their investment and become more publicly 
highlighted. Firm size is measured by Natural Asset Total Logs. 
 
2.6 Audit Committee 
The audit committee consists of a minimum of three people consisting of 
Independent Commissioners and external parties who are experts in the field of 
accounting. Companies that have a larger number of members from outside the 
issuer will be able to work more effectively and independently in overseeing 
financial reporting by company management so that the audit committee makes 
considerations for public accounting firms to provide attestation / audit services in 
a higher quality (Ardianingsih, 2013). The audit committee is measured by the 
proportion of the number of members coming from outside the Issuer, namely 
Independent Commissioners, with the number of Audit Committee members. 
The auditor specialization can be identified through the market share of the 
total assets of the company audited by a public accounting firm in a particular 
industry (Jaggi & Tsui, 1999). According to (Balsam et al., 2003) that auditors with 
the largest volume of clients in an industry have a comprehensive understanding 
and are specialists in that industry. In this study using market share to measure 
specialist auditor variables. 
 
 
 
3. RESEARCH METHOD 
Data analysis method in this research is multiple regression analysis with 
the help of Eviews. This type of comparative causal research, the sampling 
technique uses purposive sampling method with a population of 137 companies, a 
sample of 38 companies and a total of 228 companies. The object of research is real 
estate & property companies in 2013-2018. 
 
4. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
4.1 RESULT 
Descriptive Statistical Analysis 
Based on the descriptive statistical analysis the following sample 
description is obtained: 
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Frequency Mean  Std. Dev 
Audit Quality 0 = 47% ; 1= 53% 0,53508 0,499865 
Audit Tenure 0 = 67%; 1 = 33% 0,68421 0,465852 
Audit rotation 0 = 80%; 1 = 20% 0,20614 0,405423 
Audit Committee 
2 = 11 % 
3= 86%  
4 = 3% 2,89035 0,421131 
 
Table 2. Descriptive Statistics of Firm Size 
Variable Min Max Mean  Std. Dev 
Firm size 
1.600.
000 
521.000.0
000.0000 
872.000.
000.000 
4.270.000.
000.000 
 
Based on the results of the descriptive statistics above it can be seen that: 
a. In the audit quality variable (Y) the frequency value can be seen where 
the number of companies that receive going concern audit opinions is 
53%, and the number of companies that receive going concern audit 
opinions is 47%. The mean value of Audit Quality is 0.53508, which 
means that the average company that receives a going concern audit 
opinion on Real Estate & Property companies listed on the Indonesia 
Stock Exchange (IDX) in 2013-2018 is 53%, while the standard 
deviation value from the audit quality is 0.499865. 
b. In the audit tenure variable (X1) the frequency value can be seen where 
the number of companies audited by the same public accounting firm 
for <3 years is 33% of the company, and where the number of 
companies audited by the same public accounting firm for> 3 years is 
67% of the company. The average audit tenure value is 0.68. This 
shows that the sample companies have an average audit tenure of 0 
years and 1 year because the value of 0.68 is between the values of 0 
and 1. The standard deviation of audit tenure is 0.465852. the average 
value is 0.47295. 
c. In the Audit rotation variable (X2) the frequency value can be seen in 
the number of companies that conduct audit rotation as many as 20% 
of companies, and the number of companies that do not do audit 
rotation as much as 80% of companies. The mean value of Audit 
rotation is 0.20614, which means that the average Real Estate & 
Property company listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange (IDX) in 
2013-2018 that conducted audit rotation or public accounting firm 
changes was only 20%, while the standard deviation value of Audit 
rotation is 0.405423. 
d. The maximum value of Firm Size (X3) is 521,000,000,000, while the 
minimum value is 1,600,000, which means that the highest level of total 
assets is at PT Bumi Serpong Damai in 2018, while the lowest level of 
total assets is at Lippo Cikarang Tbk in 2016 The mean value of Firm 
Size is 872,000,000,000, while the standard deviation value of Firm 
Size is 4,270,000,000,000. 
e. The Audit Committee variable (X4) in Real Estate & Property 
companies listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange (IDX) in 2013-2018 
has at least 2 audit committee members, and a maximum of 4 audit 
committee members. The frequency value of the audit committee shows 
the number of companies that have 2 audit committee members as many 
as 25 companies or 11%, companies with 3 audit committee members 
are 196 companies or 86%, and companies with 4 audit committee 
members are 7 companies or 3% . The mean value of the Audit 
Committee is 2.890351, in the eyes of the average number of audit 
committees in Real Estate & Property companies listed on the Indonesia 
Stock Exchange (IDX) in 2013-2017 as many as 2-3 people. While the 
standard deviation of the Audit Committee is 0.421131. 
 
Chow Test 
To determine whether the CEM or FEM estimation model in forming the 
regression model, the Chow test is used. The hypothesis is tested as follows: 
Table 3. Chow Test 
Effects Test Statistic d.f. Prob. 
Cross-section F 6.206124 (37,186) 0.0000 
Cross-section Chi-square 183.321247 37 0.0000 
     Based on the results of the Chow test in Table 3, it is known that the 
probability value is 0,000. Because the probability value is 0,000 <0.05, the 
estimated model used is the fixed effect model (FEM). 
 
Hausman Test 
To determine whether the FEM or REM estimation model in forming the 
regression model, then used the Hausman test. Based on the results of the Hausman 
test, it is known that the probability value is 0.43. Because the probability value is 
0.43 ≥ 0.05, the estimation model used is the Random effect model (REM). 
 
Hypothesis testing 
In testing hypotheses, the coefficient of determination analysis, 
simultaneous influence testing (F test), and partial effect testing (t test) will be 
carried out. Statistical values of the coefficient of determination, F test, and t test 
are presented in Table 3. 
Table 4. Hypothesis Testing 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
X1 -0.068256 0.055635 -1.226842 0.2212 
X2 -0.304273 0.070734 -4.301660 0.0000 
X3 
10.400.000.0
00.000.000 
576.000.000.
000.000.000 1.805519 0.0723 
X4 0.142880 0.068507 2.085625 0.0382 
C 0.222466 0.212804 1.045406 0.2970 
 Effects Specification   
   S.D.   Rho   
Cross-section random 0.322017 0.4735 
Idiosyncratic random 0.339542 0.5265 
 Weighted Statistics   
R-squared 0.126292    Mean dependent var 0.211568 
Adjusted R-squared 0.110620    S.D. dependent var 0.359860 
S.E. of regression 0.339373    Sum squared resid 25.68381 
F-statistic 8.058476    Durbin-Watson stat 1.825630 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000004    
Based on Table 4, it is known that the coefficient of determination (Adjusted 
R-squared) of R2 = 0.11. This value can be interpreted as Audit Tenure, Audit 
rotation, Firm Size, and the Audit Committee is able to affect Audit Quality at 11% 
and the remaining 89% is influenced by other factors. 
The F test aims to test the effect of the independent variables together or 
simultaneously on the independent variables. Based on Table 4, the Prob value is 
known. (F-statistics), which is 0.00 0.05, it can be concluded that all independent 
variables, namely Audit Tenure, Audit rotation, Firm Size, and Audit Committee 
simultaneously, have a significant effect on the Audit Quality variable. 
Based on Table 4, the panel data regression equation is obtained as follows. 
Y = 0, .222466-0.068256X1-0.304273X2 + 10.400,000,000,000,000X3 + 
0.142880X4 
Based on Table 4, it is known the coefficient value of the independent 
variable audit tenure is negative with a value of Prob> 0.05, so it can be concluded 
that audit tenure has a negative negative effect on audit quality. The audit rotation 
variable is negative with a value of Prob <0.05, then audit rotation has an effect 
negative and significant effect on audit quality. Firm size is positive with a value of 
Prob> 0.05, then firm size has a positive but not significant effect on audit quality. 
The Audit Committee is positive with a value of Prob <0.05, the Audit Committee 
has a positive and significant effect on audit quality. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Moderation Significance Test (Interaction Test) 
Table 5. Interaction Test Significance of Specialist Auditors in Moderating 
Effects of Audit Tenure, Audit rotation, Firm Size, and Audit Committee on 
Audit Quality 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
X1 0.048401 0.102098 0.474062 0.6359 
X2 -0.305303 0.084713 -3.603987 0.0004 
X3 
60.800.000.000.00
0.000 
 
41.900.000.
000.000.000 1.450862 0.1482 
X4 0.127036 0.070382 1.804948 0.0725 
X1Z -0.157837 0.116475 -1.355111 0.1768 
X2Z -0.040277 0.150237 -0.268092 0.7889 
X3Z 
-
51.100.000.000.00
0.000 
    
42.400.000.
000.000.000 -1.203735 0.2300 
X4Z 0.029886 0.040896 0.730797 0.4657 
C 0.186938 0.219330 0.852316 0.3950 
 
Based on Table 5, the interaction moderation equation is obtained as 
follows: 
Y = 0.186938 + 0.048401X1-0.305303X2 + 60.800,000,000,000,000 X3 + 〖
0.127036X4 + 0.157837〗X1Z + 0.040277X2Z-51.100,000,000,000,000X3Z-
0.029886X4Z 
Given the Prob value. at X1Z is 0.1768, ie> 0.05, it is concluded that 
specialist auditors are not significant in moderating the effect of audit tenure on 
audit quality. The coefficient value of X1Z is -0.157837, so in this case the specialist 
auditor as a moderating variable weakens the effect of audit tenure on audit quality. 
So it can be concluded that, specialist auditors are not significant in moderating. 
The Prob value is known. at X2Z is 0.7889 ie> 0.05, it is concluded that the special 
auditor is not significant in moderating the effect of audit rotation on audit quality. 
The coefficient value of X2Z is -0.040277, so in this case the specialist auditor as a 
moderating variable weakens the effect of audit rotation on audit quality  Prob 
values of X3Z is 0.2300 ie> 0.05, it is concluded that specialist auditors are not 
significant in moderating the effect of firm size on audit quality. The coefficient 
value of X3Z is -51,100,000,000,000,000, so in this case the specialist auditor as a 
moderating variable weakens the influence of company size on audit quality. It is 
known that the Prob value. at X4Z is 0.4657 ie> 0.05, it is concluded that specialist 
auditors are not significant in moderating the influence of the audit committee on 
audit quality. The coefficient value of X4Z is 0.029886, so in this case the specialist 
auditor as a moderating variable strengthens the effect of the audit committee on 
audit quality. 
 
4.2 DISCUSSION 
Tenure audit has negative and not significant effect on audit quality 
Based on the statistical t test, the results showed that the coefficient value 
of the audit tenure variable was -0.068256 with a significance level of 0.2212> 0.05, 
so that the relationship between audit tenure and audit quality was partially declared 
negatively and not significant. This shows that audit tenure has a negative and not 
significant effect on audit quality in real estate & property companies listed on the 
Indonesia Stock Exchange for the period 2013-2018, which means hypothesis 1 is 
rejected. 
Audit rotation has negative but significant effect on audit quality 
Based on the statistical t test, the results showed that the coefficient value 
of the audit rotation variable is -0.304273 with a significance level of 0.00 <0.05, 
so that the relationship between audit rotation and audit quality is partially negative 
and significant. This shows that audit rotation has a negative but significant effect 
on audit quality in real estate & property companies listed on the Indonesia Stock 
Exchange for the period 2013-2018, which means hypothesis 2 is rejected. 
Firm size has positive and not significant effect on audit quality 
Based on the statistical t test, the results showed that the coefficient value 
of the firm size variable was 10.400,000,000,000,000 with a significance level of 
0.0723> 0.05, so that the relationship between firm size and audit quality was 
partially positive and not significant. This shows that firm size has a positive and 
not significant effect on audit quality in real estate & property companies listed on 
the Indonesia Stock Exchange for the period 2013-2018, which means hypothesis 
3 is accepted. 
Audit committee has a positive and significant effect on audit quality  
Based on the statistical t test, the results of the study show that the 
coefficient value of the audit committee variable is 0.142880 with a significance 
level of 0.0382 <0.05, so that the relationship between the audit committee and 
audit quality is partially positive and significant. This shows that the audit 
committee has a positive and significant effect on audit quality in real estate & 
property companies listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange for the period 2013-
2018, which means hypothesis 4 is accepted 
Specialist auditors are not significant in moderating the effects of audit tenure 
on audit quality 
Based on the interaction test, the results showed that the probability value 
was 0.1768, which is> 0.05 with a coefficient value of -0.157837, so that the 
Specialist Auditor was not significant in moderating the effect of Audit Tenure on 
audit quality. Coefficient values indicate that the Specialist Auditor as a moderating 
variable weakens the relationship between audit tenure on audit quality in Real 
Estate & Property companies listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange in the 2013-
2018 period and is not significant in moderating the effect of audit tenure on audit 
quality, which means hypothesis 5 is rejected. 
Specialist auditors are not significant in moderating the effects of audit 
rotation on audit quality 
Based on the interaction test, the results showed that the probability value 
was 0.7889, which is> 0.05 with a coefficient value of -0.040277, so that specialist 
auditors were not significant in moderating the effect of audit rotation on audit 
quality. The coefficient value indicates that the Specialist Auditor as a moderating 
variable weakens the relationship between audit rotation and audit quality in Real 
Estate & Property companies listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange for the period 
2013-2018, which means hypothesis 6 is rejected. 
Specialist auditors are not significant in moderating the effects of firm size on 
quality audit 
Based on the interaction test, the results showed that the probability value 
was based on the interaction test, the results showed that the probability value was 
0.2300, ie> 0.05 with a coefficient value of -51.100,000,000,000,000, so that 
specialist auditors were not significant in moderating the effect of firm size on 
quality an audit. The coefficient value indicates that the Specialist Auditor as a 
moderating variable weakens the relationship between Company Size and audit 
quality in Real Estate & Property companies listed on the Indonesia Stock 
Exchange for the period 2013-2018, which means hypothesis 7 is rejected 
Specialist auditors are not significant in moderating the influence of the audit 
committee on audit quality 
Based on the interaction test, the results showed that the probability value 
of 0.4657, ie> 0.05 with a coefficient value of 0.029886, so that specialist auditors 
were not significant in moderating the effect of the audit committee on audit quality. 
Coefficient values indicate that specialist auditors as a moderating variable 
strengthen the relationship between audit committees on audit quality in Real Estate 
& Property companies listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange in the period 2013-
2018, which means hypothesis 8 is rejected. 
 
5. CONCLUSION AND SUGGESTION 
5.1 Conclusion 
Based on the testing of hypotheses and analysis explained in the previous 
chapter, conclusions can be drawn, namely: 
a. Audit tenure has a negative and not significant effect on audit quality 
in Real Estate & Property companies listed on the Indonesia Stock 
Exchange in 2013-2018. 
b. Audit rotation has a negative and significant effect on audit quality in 
Real Estate & Property companies listed on the Indonesia Stock 
Exchange in 2013-2018. 
c. Firm size has a positive and not significant effect on audit quality in 
Real Estate & Property companies listed on the Stock Exchange in 
2013-2018. 
d. The Audit Committee has a positive and significant effect on audit 
quality in Real Estate & Property companies listed on the Stock 
Exchange in 2013-2018. 
e. Specialist Auditors are not significant in moderating the effect of audit 
tenure on the audit quality of Real Estate & Property companies listed 
on the Indonesia Stock Exchange in the period 2013-2018. 
f. Specialist auditors are not significant in moderating the effect of audit 
rotation on audit quality in Real Estate & Property companies listed on 
the Indonesia Stock Exchange for the period 2013-2018. 
g. Specialist Auditors are not significant in moderating the effect of firm 
size on audit quality in Real Estate & Property companies listed on the 
Indonesia Stock Exchange for the period 2013-2018. 
h. Specialist Auditors are not significant in moderating the effect of the 
auditing committee on audit quality in Real Estate & Property 
companies listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange for the period 2013-
2018. 
 
5.2 Research Limitations 
This study has several limitations, namely: 
a. The object of this research is only limited to the category of Real Estate 
& Property Companies that are listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange, 
and the data examined are from 2013 to 2018. 
b. This study uses four independent variables namely Audit Tenure, Audit 
rotation, Firm Size, Audit Committee and one dependent variable, 
namely Audit Quality, and one moderation variable, namely specialist 
auditors. 
 
5.3 Suggestion 
Based on the conclusions of the research results, the advice given is as 
follows: 
a. For Issuers, to increase investor confidence, companies must be able to 
choose auditors who have a good reputation in order to produce quality 
audits and create value for the company so that the information 
provided is accurate, reliable and transparent for investors to obtain a 
real picture of the company’s prospects in the future. The independence 
of the Audit Committee must also be further improved so that there are 
no conflicts of interest, making it easier for the auditor to form an 
opinion in the audit report in accordance with the actual conditions of 
the company. 
b. For further researchers, it is recommended to add research samples 
from all publicly listed companies listed on the Indonesia Stock 
Exchange, a longer research period so that the results obtained can be 
generalized and illustrate the real conditions over the long term, adding 
other variables such as audit fees , and the reputation of the public 
accounting firm that is suspected to affect audit quality or use 
intervening variables in research, as well as different analytical methods 
to obtain more accurate research results. 
c. Public Accounting Firm, for the public accounting firm to carry out its 
duties more professionally and maintain its independence in auditing, 
so that other parties, especially for investors, can provide confidence in 
the quality of audits produced from a public accounting firm, not only 
big four public accounting firm but also non big four public accounting 
firm. 
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